Initial public offering (IPO) activity in Europe has recently come to a near-halt and, similarly to the US, this decline has been more pronounced among small firm IPOs. Three alternative explanations have been proposed: the economies of scope hypothesis states that getting big fast has become more important, resulting in small firms being acquired; the regulatory overreach hypothesis, which states that small firms are remaining private due to an increase in the regulatory costs borne by publicly traded firms; and the market conditions hypothesis, which states that poor stock market levels have resulted in low IPO volume.
Introduction
Initial public offering (IPO) have reduced the attractiveness of going public. Supporters of the "market conditions" hypothesis argue that the drop in IPO activity is just temporary.
Third, the "economies of scope" hypothesis states that due to an ongoing change in the economy, small firms are worth more as part of a larger organization that can realize economies of scope and scale. Thus, they find it more convenient to get big fast by selling out in a trade sale (merging) rather than going public and remaining independent. The economies of scope hypothesis is based on the evidence that the decline in IPOs has been most pronounced among small firms, and that small firms have been increasingly unable to be profitable. The economies of scope hypothesis views the decline in IPO activity as a consequence of a change in the attractiveness of being big rather than small, rather than the attractiveness of being private rather than public. This paper sheds light on the decline of European IPO activity and tests the different hypotheses laid out in Gao et al. (2012) . Similarly to the US, we find that the decline in IPO activity has been mainly driven by small firms. In the main markets of the four largest European economies, the percentage of IPOs by small firms, where small firms are defined as those with less than €30 million in pre-IPO annual sales using 2011 purchasing power, has dropped to an annual average of 25.4% in 2001-2011 from an annual average of 38.2% in the six years 1995-2000 preceding the bursting of the technology bubble. Small firms may have suffered more than others from higher compliance costs, as argued by the regulatory overreach hypothesis.
On the other hand, the IPO drought may be due to an ongoing change in the economy whereby small firms receive higher valuations in trade sales (acquisitions by strategic buyers) than in public markets, because they can create greater profits as part of larger organizations rather than as small independent firms. Europe is a privileged setting in which to examine the economies of scope hypothesis. We take advantage of the presence of second markets for small companies, exempt from regulatory changes, to test whether the predictions of the regulatory overreach, market conditions, and economies of scope hypotheses hold in an environment where regulatory overreach is not as important.
We find that the decline in the number of small firm IPOs in Europe is only partly attributable to general market conditions. The decline in the number of IPOs in 2001-2003 and in 2008-2011 occurred in conjunction with unfavorable market conditions. However, our evidence suggests that the economies of scope motivation is also important. First, the profitability of small firm IPOs has declined over time, and has been persistently lower than for large firm IPOs. Among small firm IPOs, the percentage that are profitable in the three years after going public has declined from 67.1% in 1995-2000 to 44.4% in 2001-2011 , while the downtrend has been less pronounced for large firm IPOs (from 91.3% to 80.1%). The pattern of low profitability for small firms also persists among seasoned listed companies. Second, the long-run performance of small company IPOs has been poor for public-market investors. The average 3-year buy-andhold return for investors buying at the closing market price following the first 21 days of trading, has been -2.9% for small company IPOs from [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] , in contrast to +14.6% for large company IPOs. European
IPOs from 1995-2008 have given investors an equally weighted average 3-year buy-and-hold return of only 2.5%, less than 1% per year on an annualized basis.
This evidence is consistent with that in Vismara et al. (2012) , who examine European IPOs from 1995-2006.
They report a negative abnormal performance for IPOs on European second markets: the average 3-year buyand-hold abnormal return for main market IPOs has been +12.3%, whereas the average for second market IPOs has been -19.0%.
1 Third, while European IPO activity has fallen, the number of merger and acquisition (M&A) deals has risen, suggesting an increased preference for external growth by means of trade sales rather than internal growth financed by equity issues. The propensity to be acquired soon after the IPO has increased among small companies over the last decade. This is consistent with the desire to get big fast posited by the economies of scope hypothesis. Moreover, inconsistent with the regulatory overreach explanation, we find that the fraction of non-European companies listing in Europe has not been affected by regulatory changes, and listed companies are not going private more frequently in an attempt to avoid the higher compliance costs of staying public.
Finally, we test our explanation in a multiple regression with the quarterly volume of IPOs scaled by real gross domestic product (GDP) as the dependent variable. Our results support the market conditions hypothesis, as the level of general stock market valuations is found to be a primary determinant of IPO activity. However, we also find a negative time trend affecting IPO activity that is not attributable to poor market valuations. Consistent with the economies of scope hypothesis, this trend is driven by small firms.
That is, the negative time trend that is unrelated to market conditions is stronger for small firm IPOs than large firm IPOs. Evidence in support of the economies of scope hypothesis persists also in second markets.
Although facing considerably looser regulation, the number of companies going public on these markets has significantly declined over time. This downtrend on the lightly regulated second markets confirms that increased compliance costs due to SOX-like regulatory changes are not the primary cause of the drop in IPO activity since 2000.
This paper can be viewed as a companion of the Gao et al. (2012) study, which focuses exclusively on US IPOs for its empirical evidence. Their theoretical analysis predicts a decline in the number of small company IPOs in all countries with high levels of economic development. Both the present analysis and the Gao et al.
(2012) analysis attempt to explain long-term trends, while controlling for the shorter-term fluctuations in IPO volume associated with bull and bear markets. Despite substantial differences with the US environment, such as European regulatory fragmentation and the existence of second markets for small companies, we find evidence in support of the economies of scope hypothesis. The decline in the number of companies going public in the US has raised concerns about its effect on GDP and employment growth. Many public companies are indeed leaders in innovation and job creation, and the drop in IPOs may be detrimental for economic growth. The number of companies going public has also fallen in Europe, although until recently not as severely.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes securities regulation in Europe.
Section 3 defines the testable hypotheses, and Section 4 presents the sample and the results. Section 5 focuses on the second markets for small companies. In Section 6, we report the results of time series regressions with the quarterly volume of IPOs scaled by real GDP as the dependent variable. Section 7 concludes. in recommending a balance of independent directors and non-independent directors, the separation of the CEO and chairman-of-the-board positions, formal and transparent procedures for the appointment of directors to the board, and effective internal control systems (Akyol et al., 2012 (Christensen et al., 2012) .
Securities regulation in Europe
However, 'SOX-equivalent' regulations do not apply to all the companies going public in Europe, where stock exchanges are organized in segments, with a main market and one or more second markets that are typically designed to meet the needs of small and young companies . These second markets are present in all of the four countries we consider, and have been used instead of the main markets by the majority of companies going public over the last decade in these four countries. From 1995 to 2011, 3,055 IPOs took place on second markets and 893 on main markets. These 'exchange-regulated markets' are characterized by looser regulation, as defined by the European Financial Services Directive, and are not affected by regulatory changes at a national level 3 .
Testable hypotheses
A private firm in the US was much more likely to have been acquired than to go public over the last decade (Bayar and Chemmanur, 2011) . The regulatory overreach hypothesis explains this pattern as a consequence of post-SOX compliance costs, which are posited to have been detrimental to the market value of small publicly traded firms, and a lack of analyst coverage, due to the 2003 Global Settlement and the effects of decimalization. Conversely, the economies of scope hypothesis ascribes the drop in small firm IPOs to the higher earnings that can be realized as part of a larger organization rather than as a small independent company, whether the company is public or private. In this section, we present a number of testable hypotheses that emanate from the economies of scope explanation.
Profitability
The economies of scope hypothesis asserts that, in a dynamic setting where profitable growth opportunities may be lost if they are not quickly seized, a larger organization is able to earn higher profits because it can realize economies of scope and bring new technologies to market faster. Consistent with this perspective, we expect small firms to be less profitable after the IPO than is the case for large firms.
3 All the second markets of the four stock exchanges that we study here are now categorized as "exchange-regulated". The main effect is that the national listing authorities (equivalent to the US Securities and Exchange Commission) are not required to approve a firm's prospectus when its listing does not involve a public offer. In practice, shares are issued exclusively to qualified institutional buyers (QIBs), but there are no restrictions on the ability of the QIBs to resell the shares to individual investors. This model is typically associated with London's popular Alternative Investment Market (AIM), and was emulated by the other stock markets in Continental Europe when trying to (re)launch second-tier markets such as the Alternext by Euronext, the Freiverkehr in Germany (Frankfurt), and the MAC in Italy (Milan). 
Long-run performance
There is no direct implication of the economies of scope hypothesis on the relative long-run performance of small firm IPOs with respect to large firm IPOs. Low returns due to an unanticipated decrease in earnings of small companies could be either caused by increased compliance costs or by an unanticipated deterioration in profitability relative to large firms. However, if the costs brought by stricter regulation were unanticipated, companies that were already public when these changes occurred would see low returns, regardless of their size, as investors incorporated the effects into market prices. If the unanticipated increase in costs was greater for small firms on a percentage basis, as has been documented in the US (Iliev, 2010) , then small firms would have lower returns. In contrast, an unanticipated decline in the profitability of small firms due to a technological change, as argued by the economies of scope hypothesis, would result in low returns only for small firms.
Hypothesis 2: Over the last decade, the long-run returns for small firms are lower than the long-run returns for large firms.
Foreign listings
If higher compliance costs due to stricter regulation had been detrimental for European public markets' attractiveness, as argued by the regulatory overreach hypothesis, we would expect a drop in the number of foreign companies going public once European countries began to implement regulatory changes. 
Sample and results
Our sample is composed of 3,948 European IPOs that took place on the London, Euronext 4 , Frankfurt and
Milan stock exchanges from 1995 to 2011. We identify the IPOs and collect the data from the EurIPO database 5 . We focus on the stock exchanges of the UK, France, Germany, and Italy since these countries are the four largest European economies. The sample includes IPOs on both the main and second markets 6 . In this section, we test the seven testable hypotheses of the economies of scope explanation developed above, in order to shed light on the causes of the drop in European IPOs.
IPO activity in Europe has recently shown a sharp decline. Table 1 . This is inconsistent with an increased inability or unwillingness of small private firms to access the public market, as documented by Gao et al. (2012) for the US context. However, if we exclude second markets, the story is different.
In main markets, only one third of the IPOs since 1995 were conducted by small firms, and this fraction is respect to large firms, as argued by the economies of scope explanation. We now shed light on which of the two hypotheses is able to explain this pattern.
[ Table 2 reports the percentage of publicly traded firms with non-negative earnings each year from 1995 to 2011. IPOs are from the prior three years, while listed firms have been publicly traded for at least three years. We define small and large firms using a cutoff of €30 million in inflation-adjusted pre-IPO annual sales, and €250 million in fiscal year annual sales (both using 2011 purchasing power) for our IPOs and seasoned listed firms, respectively. Note that if a company grows its sales from less than €30 million before the IPO to more than €30 million during the three years after the IPO, it is still classified as a small firm.
Profitability
Thus, there is no look-ahead bias.
[ Panel A of Table 2 shows that there is a considerable decline in the post-issue profitability of small firm IPOs over time, with an approximately 20% drop in the annual fraction of profitable firms after the bubble (from 67.1% to 44.4%). In comparison, the decline in the percentage of large firm IPOs reporting positive earnings is less pronounced (from 91.3% to 80.1%). This is consistent with our first hypothesis. In general, large firms seem to make profits more easily than their smaller counterparts. The percentage of large firm
IPOs with non-negative earnings indeed averages 85.4%, compared to 50.7% for small firm IPOs, and is higher in every year of our sample period.
Panel B of Table 2 shows that among seasoned listed firms, the same pattern is present. The percentage of small firms that are profitable falls from 77.7% during 1995-2000 to 59.4% after the bubble, while the decrease is modest among large firms (from 90.4% to 84.8%). Across the entire 1995-2011 period, on average 87% of large firms have been profitable, while only 65.5% of small firms have reported positive profits in a given year. Therefore, the evidence in Table 2 is consistent with our Hypothesis 1 that the percentage of firms that are profitable in the years following the IPO decreases more among small than large companies. Figure 1 shows the evolution over time in the number of listed firms with positive earnings, distinguishing between small and large firms using the data from Table 2 . For each year, the number of small (large) firms is computed as the sum of small (large) firm IPOs from the prior 3 years and small (large) firms listed by more than three years, with earnings per share available from Datastream. An inspection of the graph clearly reveals that the fraction of unprofitable firms, represented by the dark shaded area, is larger among small companies and is widening over time. Conversely, the fraction of unprofitable large firms is smaller and remains quite stable across the sample years. This evidence is consistent with the predictions of the economies of scope hypothesis.
[ FIGURE 1 ]
Long-run performance
We measure stock price performance as 3-year buy-and-hold returns (BHR), measured from the closing market price after the first 21 days of trading until the 3-year anniversary (35 months) or the closing market price on the delisting day, if this occurs earlier. Table 3 shows that mean 3-year BHR returns decreased from 4.9% for companies listing during 1995-2000 to 0% for those listing during [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . Over the entire sample period, the equally weighted 3-year BHR averaged 2.5%, less than 1% per year. Most importantly, large firm IPOs outperform small firm IPOs: on average, the 3-year BHR is 14.6% for large and -2.9% for small companies. Average returns associated with the two subperiods, before and after the technology bubble burst in 2000, are positive for large firm IPOs (19.7% and 8.3%), while they are negative for small firm IPOs (-2.5% and -3.3%). With a few exceptions (1997 and 2006) , the poorer long-run performance of small firm IPOs exists across all of the sample years. Regardless of the cause, the low realized returns on small company IPOs would inevitably dampen investor enthusiasm towards them, resulting in lower volume. One possible motivation is, as argued by Gao et al. (2012) , that the declining profitability of small firms, if unanticipated, results in low returns. Although we do not find evidence that the long-run returns for small firms decreased more than the long-run returns for large firms, as predicted in our Hypothesis 2, we show that the underperformance of IPOs is concentrated among small firms, consistent with the evidence for the US in Ritter (2011) and Gao et al. (2012) .
[ 
Foreign listings
The fraction of IPOs from foreign companies on our four European markets did not decrease over the last decade. As reported in Table 4 Although most capital raising occurs predominantly in domestic markets, the decreasing transaction costs resulting from ongoing financial globalization have pushed more companies to turn to global markets as a source of funds (Kim and Weisbach, 2008) . Hence, an impact of the overreach of regulation may be hidden by the higher mobility of IPOs. To this extent, Table 4 reports the fraction of European firms going public abroad, namely the US and other countries that have received an increasing interest by European issuers over the last decade ('other exchanges' includes those of Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore, India, and Canada).
Results show that the flow of European companies going public abroad, either in the US or in other countries, is minimal. The annual average fraction is 0.7% for US exchanges, and 0.2% for other exchanges.
This reveals that European companies have not started emigrating to other countries after the regulatory tightening, while European IPO markets have become more attractive.
[ Conversely, the propensity to acquire after going public has decreased. The fraction of newly listed firms making at least one acquisition has dropped from 42.3% to 28.7%. By splitting the analysis according to firm size, evidence shows that the upward trend in being targeted is driven by small firms. Before the bubble, 7.4% of small and 6.8% of large firms were acquired in the three years following the IPO; after the bubble, these percentages change to 8.5% and 5.4% respectively. The fraction of firms completing at least one M&A as an acquirer is instead decreasing regardless of firm size: from 40.4% to 26.6% among small firm IPOs, and from 47.5% to 34.5% among large firm IPOs 8 . Overall, the evidence in Table 5 is consistent with our Hypothesis 5, that the percentage of small firms that go public and are acquired soon after their IPO has increased over the last decade. Our Hypothesis 6, predicting an increase in the percentage of small firms that go public and make acquisitions after their IPO, does not find support.
[ The fraction of companies that decide to delist fluctuates across the years, with no striking evidence of an increased propensity to leave the public market in the last decade, consistent with our seventh hypothesis.
The percentages of 2006 (1.7%) and 2007 (0.3%) are far below the average value of the sample period (3.3%), while the result of 2008 (3.3%) may be influenced by the advent of the financial crisis. Also the mean delisting rate in the pre-bubble period is slightly higher than the post-bubble value. Hence, there is apparently no support for arguing that the IPO drought among small firms is primarily caused by increased costs of going (and staying) public. At least, there is no significant increase over the last decade in the fraction of IPOs that subsequently go private as an independent firm, consistent with Hypothesis 7.
8 The number of acquisitions is from Thomson OneBanker and considers all completed deals within three years from the IPO. We do not test whether these changes are statistically significant or not. There is industry clustering, so the number of independent observations is less than the total number of observations.
Second markets
The existence of second-tier markets is a peculiarity of European stock exchanges that should not be neglected. 9 The role of second markets, characterized by considerably looser regulation, has been relevant in Europe. The most popular second market in Europe, London's Alternative Investment Market (AIM), accounts for 79% of the IPOs taking place in London from 1995 to 2011. As documented by Vismara et al. (2012) , these markets are dominated by small firms. In particular, they provide small firms that do not succeed in meeting main markets' requirements with an easier opportunity to go public. Since second markets have not been affected by the post-SOX regulatory tightening, the motivations behind the regulatory overreach hypothesis do not apply. Thus, second markets represent an ideal setting in which to test whether the predictions of the economies of scope hypothesis persist even in the absence of regulatory concerns.
Our previous analysis of the profitability of recent IPOs revealed that large firms seem to be able to remain profitable more easily than small firms. If the decrease in profitability was primarily caused by increased compliance costs, we would expect a higher level of profitability among second market IPOs, which are exempt from strict regulatory requirements. The increase in the fraction of foreign companies going public in European markets, documented in the previous section and inconsistent with the regulatory overreach hypothesis, needs to be clarified by considering the two market categories separately. Only main markets are indeed affected by regulatory changes. Thus, the aggregate result may by driven by second markets, characterized by a substantially larger number of companies going public each year. An increasingly large number of non-European companies going public on second markets to avoid higher compliance costs may hide a negative trend on main markets, which would instead be consistent with the regulatory overreach hypothesis. However, Table 8 reveals that this is not the case. The market share of foreign IPOs is increasing both in main and second markets. Before the technology bubble burst in 2000, the percentage of IPOs by non-European firms averages 1.5% on main markets and 2.7% on second markets; from 2001 onwards, these percentages increase to 4.8% and 11.8%, respectively. Thus, the upward trend in non-European IPOs is confirmed also on main markets, despite increased compliance costs. This is in contrast with the predictions of the regulatory overreach hypothesis.
[ Our previous analysis on post-listing activity documented that the percentage of small firms that are acquired soon after their IPO has increased, and that regulatory changes have apparently not pushed publicly traded firms to go private more frequently. We now test the implications of the economies of scope hypothesis at the market level. Specifically, a sharper increase in the propensity to be acquired should be observed among second market IPOs, where the presence of small firms is predominant. At the same time, the regulatory overreach hypothesis would predict a higher propensity to delist only for main market IPOs, in an attempt to avoid compliance costs. Results are shown in Table 9 .
[ among second market IPOs. These patterns suggest that the desire to get big fast by becoming part of a larger organization concerns small firms predominantly, as posited by the economies of scope explanation. The propensity to acquire is instead decreasing in both markets. The fraction of firms making at least one acquisition decreases from 45.8% to 36.4% after the bubble burst among main market IPOs, and from 41.0%
to 26.9% among second market IPOs. Inconsistent with the regulatory overreach hypothesis, the average propensity to delist is lower for main market IPOs (1.4% on average) than for second market IPOs (4.1%).
Additionally, while this percentage increases among second market IPOs, which are exempt from most regulatory requirements, it decreases among main market IPOs, where companies instead face the increased regulatory costs of staying public.
Time-series regressions explaining IPO activity
Market conditions have been widely documented to play a substantial role in a firm's decision to go public. This evidence supports the market conditions hypothesis. In addition to cyclical fluctuations, however, there is a negative trend in IPO activity, which could be due to either increased compliance costs and/or structural changes penalizing small firms.
[
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To discriminate among the alternative explanations for changing IPO volume, we examine the volume of European IPOs in a time-series setting, and test whether a downward trend in the number of companies going public is present after controlling for market conditions. The economies of scope hypothesis predicts a more pronounced decline among small firm IPOs. Table 10 shows the results of the quarterly time series regression estimated using maximum likelihood with a first-order autoregressive error term. The dependent variable in Model (1) is the number of IPOs in each quarter divided by quarterly real GDP (measured in € trillions) in the same quarter. In Model (2) and Model (3), the dependent variable is respectively the scaled number of small and large firm IPOs, using a cutoff of €30 million in inflation-adjusted pre-IPO annual sales. In Model (4), the dependent variable is the scaled number of second market IPOs. The aim is to test whether, in the absence of compliance costs, the decline in the number of IPOs persists.
There are three explanatory variables of interest. First, a time trend variable is aimed at capturing the hypothesized gradual impact of economies of scope and speed to product market on scaled IPO volume.
Second, a dummy variable that equals one for quarters beginning with the passage of the first European SOX-equivalent code, introduced in February 2002 by German authorities, should clarify whether excessive regulatory costs are a valid motivation for the low IPO volume of the last decade. Third, the inflationadjusted FTSE EuroMid index value controls for the influence of market valuations.
Results in Table 10 show that the coefficient of the time trend variable is negative and significant at the 5% level in Model (1) 
Conclusions
Three alternative explanations have been proposed for the recent drop in the number of firms going public in Europe. First, the "economies of scope" hypothesis (Gao et al., 2012) , which states that getting big fast has become more important, resulting in small firms being acquired; second, the "regulatory overreach"
hypothesis, which states that small firms are remaining private due to an increase in the regulatory costs borne by publicly traded firms; and third, the market conditions hypothesis, which points to depressed stock market levels as the primary cause for the low IPO volume. Although the patterns are not quite as strong as those documented by Gao et al. (2012) for US IPOs, our European evidence for 1995-2011 suggests that small firm IPO activity is experiencing a long-term secular decline. Consistent with the market conditions hypothesis, European IPO volume has been depressed by lower market valuations following the collapse of the technology bubble, the Panic of 2008, and the Eurozone crisis. However, we find a negative trend in IPO volume that persists even after controlling for the influence of market conditions on IPO volumes, and is largely consistent with the economies of scope hypothesis.
The drop in the number of IPOs has been less dramatic in Europe than in the US prior to the Eurozone crisis, thanks to the presence of second, loosely regulated, markets. Even in these markets, however, we find a negative trend in the yearly number of IPOs. This is inconsistent with the regulatory overreach hypothesis: in an environment where the compliance costs of being a publicly traded firm are minimal and did not change over time, there is no regulatory-based reason for such a decrease in the number of companies going public.
As in the US, small publicly traded companies are increasingly finding it difficult to earn positive profits.
Furthermore, M&A activity has been on an uptrend. After going public, small firms are increasingly being acquired, suggesting that small firms prefer to get big fast by becoming part of a larger organization rather than to remain independent and rely on internal growth as either a private or public firm. As in the U.S., public market investors have earned low returns on small company IPOs. European small company IPOs from 1995 to 2008 have given public market investors an average 3-year buy-and-hold return of -2.9%, markedly lower than the average 3-year BHR of 14.6% for large company IPOs, consistent with the empirical results of Vismara et al. (2012) . The average 3-year BHR on all IPOs has been only 2.5%, giving investors an average return of less than 1% per year. Our analysis suggests that the 2004-2007 boom in second market IPOs, primarily on London's AIM, is unlikely to be repeated. Figure 1 . Profitability of small and large listed firms. The graph reports the number of firms with earnings per share available from Datastream each year from 1995 to 2011, categorized by firm size and profitability. The black line divides small firms from large firms. The light shaded area represents the fraction of firms with non-negative earnings per share, while the dark shaded area represents the fraction of firms with negative earnings per share. For each year, the number of small firms is the sum of small firm IPOs from the prior three years (pre-IPO annual sales < €30 million, 2011 purchasing power) and small firms listed more than three years (annual sales < €250 million, 2011 purchasing power). Analogously, the number of large firms is the sum of large firm IPOs from the prior three years and large firms listed more than three years. 
